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THE “SECOND LABOUR
TRILOGY”:
A COMMENT ON R. V. ADVANCE
CUTTING, DUNMORE V.
ONTARIO, AND R.W.D.S.U. V.
PEPSI-COLA
B. Jamie Cameron*

I. INTRODUCTION
2002 is a year of reckoning for the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 The
first 20 years of decision making have registered victories in the name of constitutional rights, and missed opportunities too. Much of the attention on this
anniversary will place the jurisprudence under scrutiny, in an attempt to understand why the Supreme Court of Canada enforced the guarantees in certain
instances and deferred to the democratic process in others.
At present, the pattern is one of astute decision making that is case-specific,
and prefers to resolve issues on narrow grounds. In this, the Court negotiates a
course between confrontation with legislatures and the public and its duty to
enforce the Charter. Examples of trade-offs between the judiciary’s responsibility to enforce the Charter and its perception of institutional vulnerability include
Little Sisters Books & Art Emporium v. Canada,2 R. v. Sharpe,3 and Suresh v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration).4

* Associate Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School. Her primary teaching and research interests over the years have been constitutional and Charter law, American constitutional law,
criminal law and freedom of expression.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
2
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (concluding that Customs Canada had discriminated against Little
Sisters and infringed its rights under s. 2(b), and refusing a remedy in the circumstances). See J.
Benedet, “Little Sisters Book & Art Emporium v. Minister of Justice: Sex Equality and the Attack
on Butler” (2001), 390 H.L.J. 197; and B. Ryder, “The Little Sisters Case, Administrative Censorship and Obscenity Law” (2001), 39 O.H.L.J. 207; see generally, J. Cameron, “Anticipation:
Expressive Freedom and the Supreme Court of Canada in the New Millennium” (2001), S. Ct. L.
Rev. 67.
3
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (accommodating expressive freedom through an elaborate exercise in
statutory interpretation while avoiding the furor which would have ensued had the Criminal Code’s
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In this workmanlike approach to the Charter, much is predictable, and what
is not is institutionally safe. It is difficult to imagine this a bold Court, or one
that aspires to a vision of constitutional rights. Yet if that is the impression,
counterexamples can still be found. For instance, the rise of the worker was
easily the most notable development in the latter part of 2001 and early 2002.
Against a backdrop of long-standing deference to legislative and administrative
decision makers, the Court supported trade unions three times in succession.
First, R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd. chose collective interests over
individual rights to uphold a legislative scheme which imposed serious constraints on section 2(d)’s negative and positive entitlements.5 Then, Dunmore v.
Ontario (Attorney General) all but abandoned precedent to hold a legislature
accountable for not protecting the meaningful exercise of associational freedom.6 Finally, in R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages
(West), the Court unanimously placed itself on the side of workers in a decision
that set up common law limits on secondary picketing against the expressive
freedom of picketers.7
Previously, workers had been perennial losers under the Charter. In that regard, though Dolphin Delivery Ltd. acknowledged in dicta that section 2(b)
protects labour picketing,8 the pattern was set in 1987, when a majority of the
Supreme Court gave section 2(d) what can only be described as a deadening
interpretation. In concluding that associational freedom is an individual right
and does not protect collective bargaining or the right to strike, the Labour
Trilogy relegated the guarantee to irrelevance. 9 This year, however, unions and

child pornography legislation been in part or in whole struck down). See Cameron, id. (commenting
on this aspect of Sharpe).
4
2002 SCC 1 (holding that it is unconstitutional to deport a refugee who faces a substantial
risk of torture on refoulement and allowing, at the same time, that there may be exceptions to that
rule).
5
2001 SCC 70 (upholding provisions which compelled construction workers to join one of
five unions designated by the statute).
6
2001 SCC 94 (imposing a constitutional duty on the government to protect the s. 2(d)
rights of agricultural workers).
7
2002 SCC 8 (modifying the common law rule that secondary labour picketing is per se illegal).
8
R.W.D.S.U. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 (concluding that the Charter did
not apply and that secondary picketing could justifiably be limited); see also BCGEU v. British
Columbia (Attorney General), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 (upholding an injunction prohibiting union
picketing of courthouses); but see Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (upholding the
union’s right to compel union dues from non-members for non-collective bargaining purposes); and
U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Canada Ltd., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083 [hereinafter “KMart”] (upholding a union’s right to engage in “leafleting” at a secondary site).
9
The Labour Trilogy comprises Re Public Service Employee Relations Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R.
313 [hereinafter the “Alberta Reference”]; P.S.A.C. v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424; and
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their causes emerged victorious in the decisions above which are referred to in
this article as the “second labour trilogy”. Exploring how and why the rights of
workers caught the Court’s attention is the subject of this article. At the outset,
it can be noted that, under existing authority, each of these decisions could have
been decided differently. From that perspective, it becomes especially important to understand the significance of this trilogy.
Advance Cutting, Dunmore, and Pepsi-Cola may also have implications that
extend beyond the constitutionalization of labour relations. After analyzing
each in sequence, a concluding section considers their implications for other
Charter issues. In doing so, it asks whether the second trilogy should be understood as a result-oriented expression of judicial sympathy for workers or seen,
instead, as decisions that rest on principles of Charter interpretation.
In either case, the trilogy demonstrates the McLachlin Court’s willingness to
challenge the assumptions of the Charter’s early landmarks. Finally, the article
closes by inviting the Court to re-think other assumptions of Charter interpretation
and,
in
particular,
the
relationship between section 15’s equality guarantee and its limits under section
1.
1. Freedom of Association
In effect, the Labour Trilogy limited freedom of association to the formal
right of individuals to establish, belong to, and maintain associations. Activities
undertaken in association, by way of collective endeavour, had no status under
section 2(d), unless the self same activity would be independently protected by
the Charter if undertaken by an individual.10 Significantly, a majority of the
judges on the Trilogy panel rejected a conception of the guarantee as collective
in nature; to avoid the risk that associations might thereby be granted special

R.W.D.S.U. v. Sask., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460. See also Professional Institute of the Public Service of
Canada v. Northwest Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367 (rejecting an association’s
claim that it was entitled to be recognized for collective bargaining purposes); Canadian Egg
Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 [hereinafter “CEMA”] (rejecting a claim that
excluding egg producers from a marketing scheme violated s. 2(d); and Delisle v. Canada (Deputy
Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 [hereinafter “Delisle”] (rejecting the claim that excluding
the RCMP from the federal government’s statutory labour regime violated s. 2(d)).
10
It is difficult to draw doctrine from the fragmented opinions by the Court’s panel of six in
the Alberta Reference, the leading decision in the Labour Trilogy. At most, LeDain J., for the
majority result, and McIntyre J., concurring, agreed that s. 2(d) protects the bare right to form an
association, as well as associational activities that are protected by other Charter guarantees, such as
s. 2(b). While McIntyre J. would also have included associational activities which would be lawful
if undertaken by an individual, Dickson C.J. and Wilson J. dissented on the basis that a guarantee of
associational freedom must include a collective element.
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status under the Charter, they concluded that freedom of association should be
regarded as an individual right.11 In Professional Institute v. Northwest Territories, the late Sopinka J. synthesized the Trilogy’s conception of associational
freedom in a four-point test.12 A valiant attempt to propose concrete doctrine
nonetheless floundered when the framework failed to attract majority support. 13
As a result, labour union claims and freedom of association more generally lay
dormant for the most part until the late 1990s, as there was little point litigating
section 2(d) issues that could not succeed. 14 As the millennium approached, the
Supreme Court issued decisions in two freedom of association cases but rejected the claim both times; in doing so it impliedly endorsed Professional
Institute’s four-point test, albeit without expressly adopting it.15
As LeBel J. acknowledged in Advance Cutting, deference was the organizing
principle of the section 2(d) labour relations jurisprudence. There, he indicated
that the Court’s reluctance to accept that “the whole field of labour relations”
should fall under the Charter was well established. 16 After describing the judiciary’s “non-intervention policy” in some detail, he declared that labour relations
had deliberately been left “entirely to the political process, Parliament and
provincial legislatures”.17 His reasons in Advance Cutting confirm that LeBel J.
supported this “hands-off policy” for removing “any Charter protection from
the bargaining procedures and rights that have largely defined the role of un-

11

As McIntyre J. explained in the Alberta Reference, supra, note 10, at 404, “[i]f Charter
protection is given to an association for its lawful acts and objects, then the Charter-protected rights
of the association would exceed those of the individual merely by virtue of the fact of association.”
12
The four-point framework declared: “... first, that s. 2(d) protects the freedom to establish,
belong to and maintain an association; second, that s. 2(d) does not protect an activity solely on the
ground that the activity is a foundational or essential purpose of an association; third, that s. 2(d)
protects the exercise in association of the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals; and
fourth, that s. 2(d) protects the exercise in association of the constitutional rights and freedoms of
individuals. Professional Institute, supra, note 9, at 402.
13
Three of the panel’s seven members dissented from Sopinka J.’s majority disposition, and
three others wrote separately to support the result, without endorsing its reasoning.
14
See Black v. Law Society of Alberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591 (invalidating restrictions on the
freedom to form interprovincial law partnerships under s. 6 rather than s. 2(d)); and R. v. Skinner,
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235 (concluding that Criminal Code provisions prohibiting the public solicitation
of prostitution do not offend s. 2(d)); but see Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R.
569 (concluding, without discussing s. 2(d) as an independent guarantee, that Quebec’s statutory
referendum framework violated s. 2(b) and (d)).
15
CEMA, supra, note 9, at 232; and Delisle, id., at 1007 (stating that CEMA had cited the
Professional Institute test “with approval”).
16
Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, at para. 156.
17
Id., at para. 161 (emphasis added).
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ions”.18 Testing his assertion that the Charter has remained “a neutral force” is a
key objective of the discussion which follows. 19

II. ADVANCE CUTTING AND CORING LTD. V. QUEBEC
Advance Cutting in some ways reprised the issues decided in Lavigne v.
O.P.S.E.U.20 There, an individual complained that mandatory dues check-off
violated his negative entitlement under section 2(d) to be free from compelled
association with his workplace labour union. In fact, Mr. Lavigne was not a
member of and was not required to join the union; nor did he resist the obligation to pay Rand formula dues. Rather, he objected to that portion of mandatory
dues which was deflected from collective bargaining purposes to support an
assortment of non-workplace causes. In this, he complained that he was compelled to support and be affiliated with objectionable purposes, contrary to the
Charter.
The scheme challenged in Advance Cutting was quite different. There, legislation sought to regulate Quebec’s construction industry as comprehensively as
possible. In terms of section 2(d)’s negative entitlement, provincial legislation
compelled workers, as a condition of employment, to obtain a competency
certificate and to choose membership in one of five government-recognized
employee associations.21 By requiring workers to become union members, as a
matter of law, the regime violated the Rand formula’s compromise between the
closed shop and the free rider. As Bastarache J. explained, in dissent, the formula balanced the interests of individuals in “not being forced to associate with
an organization against their will with the interest of the majority in preventing
a minority from acquiring the fruits of collective bargaining without having to
pay for it”.22 This landmark in Canadian labour relations entitled the unions to
dues check-off, and allowed workers the choice of belonging to the organization or not. Under Quebec’s scheme, however, construction workers were

18

Id., at para. 162 (emphasis added).
Id., stating that the Charter has remained “a neutral force” on questions related to labour
relations.
20
Supra, note 8.
21
The appellants were charged under s. 119.1 of an Act Respecting Labour Relations, Vocational Training and Manpower Management in the Construction Industry, R.S.Q., c. R-20, which
prohibited employers from hiring workers, and workers from performing work in the industry,
without a competency certificate as required by the statute. Section 28 provided that workers could
not obtain a competency certificate without joining one of the five union groups designated by the
legislation.
22
Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, at para. 4 (quoting Trade Union Law in Canada) (emphasis in original).
19
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required to support the costs of collective bargaining and to become members
of the union. Moreover, by setting conditions on access to employment, the
statute also affected the freedom to associate.23 In comparison to Lavigne,
Advance Cutting’s consequences for associational freedom were drastic.
Returning briefly to Lavigne, all seven members of the panel rejected the individual’s claim to be free from compelled financial association with the union’s broader causes. While four judges found no breach of section 2(d), three
found an infringement that was justifiable under section 1.24 Ironically, though
the Labour Trilogy defined freedom of association as an individual right, Mr.
Lavigne lost because the union’s collective interest in pursuing causes outside
the workplace was paramount. Consequently, Lavigne counted as a victory for
labour, but confirmed the near impossibility of establishing a breach under
section 2(d). From that perspective, it is difficult to agree with LeBel J. who, in
Advance Cutting, denied that freedom of association is an “inferior right, barely
tolerated and narrowly circumscribed”.25 Under the jurisprudence prior to the
second trilogy, an individualist conception of the guarantee spurned collective
activities when the “positive” right was in issue, only to rally around collective
endeavour, at the expense of an individual’s freedom from compulsion, when
the “negative” entitlement was at stake.
In testing the legislation regulating of Quebec’s construction industry against
the Rand formula, Advance Cutting exposed deep rifts among members of the
Court. Four judges found no breach of the Charter, and four others were adamant that Quebec’s compulsory membership scheme fundamentally compromised the guarantee of associational freedom. In the event, Iacobucci J.
provided the decisive vote which found a breach which was saved under section 1.26

23

Under the legislation, workers were not eligible to work in the construction industry unless
they had lived in Quebec the previous year, had worked at least 300 hours, and were under the age
of 50. Regional quotas also limited the number of workers in each predetermined region in the
province.
24
Justice La Forest with Sopinka and Gonthier JJ., concurring, upheld the limit under s. 1;
Wilson J., with L’Heureux-Dubé and Cory JJ., concurring, found no breach of s. 2(d)); and
McLachlin J. likewise found no breach, albeit for different reasons; Lavigne, supra, note 8.
25
Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, at para. 208.
26
Oral argument was heard in March 2000, but the Court’s decision was not released until
October 2001, some 20 months later. Justice LeBel, with Gonthier and Arbour JJ., concurring,
found no breach of s. 2(d); L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote separate reasons concurring in that conclusion; Bastarache J., with McLachlin C.J.C. and Major and Binnie JJ. concurring, found a breach
that could not be saved by s. 1; in a brief opinion that recalled Sopinka J.’s pivotal role in Egan v.
Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, Iacobucci J. agreed with the four judges who found a breach, and
then supported the result advocated by the other four who upheld the legislation.
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One element in the question whether section 2(d) should be seen as an individual or a collective entitlement is the symmetry, or lack thereof, between the
guarantee’s positive and negative entitlements. In logic, if the Charter prohibits
the state from interfering with the exercise of fundamental freedoms, it must
also prohibit the state from compelling individuals to exercise a fundamental
freedom against their will. The Court’s conclusion in R.J.R.-MacDonald v.
Canada (Attorney General), that the government’s mandatory labeling provision failed the minimal impairment test, essentially recognized that principle.27
The same principle found voice, earlier, in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.’s powerful statement that freedom is characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint, and that a person who is compelled by the state to a course of action or
inaction which would not otherwise have been chosen is not truly free. 28 Even
so, the asymmetry of this jurisprudence is that the Court remains hesitant to
enforce claims based on an individual’s freedom from compulson.29
With Gonthier and Arbour JJ. concurring, LeBel J. wrote for three of the
four judges who found no breach of section 2(d) in Advance Cutting. In doing
so, he rejected the suggestion that the guarantee’s negative entitlement should
be seen as a “simple mirror-image of the positive right of association”.30 He
regarded it as necessary, in the interests of democracy, to place “some inner
limits and restrictions” on section 2(d)’s potential for freedom from association.31 Thus he adopted LaForest J.’s rationale in Lavigne, that “forced associations which flow from the functioning of democracy cannot be severed”
through the Charter’s intervention. 32 Put differently, association can be compelled if it serves such purposes, as “[d]emocracy is not primarily about withdrawal, but fundamentally about participation in the life and management of
democratic institutions like unions”.33 Allowing individuals to withdraw would
compromise their “group voice” and deny them “the benefits arising from an
association”.34 Meanwhile, L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s sole concurrence advocated
the more radical position that section 2(d) does not include a negative entitlement.35
27

[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199.
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336-37.
29
In addition to Lavigne, supra, note 8, see Slaight Communications v. Davidson, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1038 (upholding a human rights tribunal decision, challenged under s. 2(b), which compelled an employer to write a designated letter of reference for a wrongfully dismissed employee).
30
Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, at para. 206.
31
Id., at para. 208.
32
Id., at para. 207.
33
Id.
34
Id., at para. 208.
35
See, e.g., id., at para. 58 (stating that it is “antithetical to the purpose and scope” of s. 2(d)
to protect a negative entitlement); para. 67 (declaring that if the purpose of associational freedom “
28
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To answer what could not be disputed, that construction workers required by
law to join one of five designated unions were placed under an involuntary
regime of compelled association, LeBel J. insisted that the obligation had no
more than a “limited impact” on the “asserted” right not to associate. 36 He was
led to this conclusion by his conception of ideological conformity, which he
adopted as the standard of breach for the negative entitlement. In this the judge
relied on McLachlin J.’s concurrence in Lavigne and her finding, there, that
ideological coercion was not inherent in the payment of mandatory dues. 37
Analogizing from dues to compelled membership, he declared that involuntary
association is “neutral”, absent evidence of ideological conformity. 38
Further, LeBel J. observed that, in contrast to Lavigne, where the appellant
had specified the causes to which he objected, “no witness came forward to
assert that he felt or believed that joining a union associated him with activities
he disapproved of”.39 Likewise, there was no evidence of union practices that
imposed values or opinions, no evidence about the internal life of construction
unions, and no indication that the union limited free expression in a way that
might trigger section 2(d)’s negative entitlement. 40 In LeBel J.’s view, the
statute imposed little more than a “bare obligation to belong”, and did not
create any mechanism to enforce ideological conformity. 41
He conceded that it is well known and well documented that unions intervene in political and social debate. Still, he was far from persuaded that Quebec
unions have “a constant ideology”, act “in constant support of a particular cause

‘is to permit the collective pursuit of common goals’, then the very concept of a ‘negative freedom
of association’ becomes suspect.”); para. 75 (claiming that “judicial parsimony” is appropriate, in
defining the scope of s. 2(d), because constitutional remedies are “powerful tools which ought to be
used with prudence”); and para. 76 (describing the negative entitlement as having a “tainted pedigree” aimed at the right not to associate).
36
Id., at para. 278; see also para. 277 (stating that “[t]his limited form of compelled association respects fundamental democratic values” and that it requires “only a limited commitment from
construction employees”); and para. 218 (describing the obligation to join a union as a “very
limited one”).
37
In Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211, McLachlin J. found no breach of s. 2(d) on
the facts, because in her view the payment of union dues under the Rand formula could not reasonably be seen as compelling Lavigne into ideological conformity with the union’s causes. Meantime,
while also recognizing ideological conformity as a factor, La Forest J. in Lavigne supported a
broader conception of the negative right and found, specifically, that the compelled association
violated s. 2(d) because it extended to areas outside the areas of common interest to which the Rand
formula’s rationale applied.
38
Advance Cutting, 2001 SCC 70, at para. 201.
39
Id., at para. 220.
40
Id., at para. 223.
41
Id., at para. 218.
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or policy”, or seek to “impose that ideology on their members”. 42 Any such
assumption, in his view, would indulge impermissible stereotypes of the union
movement as “authoritarian and undemocratic”.43 As far as LeBel J. was concerned, the appellants had based their case on a misguided notion of “some
absolute right” which, absent concrete evidence of imposed conformity, “may
not rest on a generalized suspicion of the nature of unions and their management of internal life”.44
In discounting the infringement this way, LeBel J.’s reasons are strikingly
formalistic. Though others could be added, two examples from equality jurisprudence illustrate the flaw in that approach. First, against the proposition that
racially segregated schools do not discriminate against black children without
proof of inequality on a school-by-school or student-by-student basis, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of Education that separate is not
equal.45 Counting and comparing how many pencils, blackboards and playgrounds black and white children had was not the issue: segregation was a
question of principle. Second, and by the same token, the affirmative action
programs are not restricted to those who can prove that they themselves have
directly suffered discrimination. 46 If the above parallels are not perfect, they are
close enough to show that LeBel J.’s reasons rested on a formalistic conception
of compelled association.
Meanwhile, Mr. Justice Bastarache’s passionate dissent drew concurrences
from McLachlin C.J., as well as from Major and Binnie JJ. Though he disagreed with LeBel J.’s interpretation of ideological conformity, the meaning of
democracy and its implications for forced association marked the true point of
difference between the two. Without settling the content of associational freedom, Bastarache J. accepted, for purposes of Advance Cutting, that ideological
conformity encompassed all aspects of the case. Therefore, whether or not
forced association might be considered prima facie in breach of section 2(d), he
42

Id., at para. 227.
Id.
44
Id., at para. 232.
45
U.S. 347 (1954) 483.
46
Race or gender-conscious remedies are not particularly controversial when the individual
benefitted is a direct victim of discrimination; accordingly, affirmative action programs must rest
on the broader rationale that members of the group are eligible as beneficiaries, regardless whether
they have suffered discrimination.
It is also useful to remember that a formalistic approach is not foreign to labour relations;
in the early 20th century, during the infamous Lochner era, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated
statutory provisions aimed at equalizing the relationship between employees and their employers,
on the ground that state interference offended the “equality of right” that each side in the employment relationship enjoyed. The fiction there was that the worker and his boss were formal, legal
equals.
43
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concluded, at the least, that the government must justify coerced association in
circumstances where ideological conformity is imposed. 47
On the merits, Bastarache J. found that ideological conformity is unavoidable in a scheme of compelled union membership. That conclusion followed his
characterization of the union movement as “a participant in the political and
social debate at the core of Canadian democracy”.48 Additionally and by way of
prelude to his reasons in Dunmore, he remarked that “[t]he collective character
of the right to associate is undeniable because collective activity is not equivalent to the addition of individual activities”. 49 That collective endeavour may be
an important and distinctive function of an association did not mean, however,
that membership can be compelled by the state. Recognizing that the collective
force of union membership can be politically and socially potent, Bastarache J.
held that it must be “constituted democratically” to conform to section 2(d).50
More “independent evidence” of the ideological views of specific unions
was unnecessary because unions designated by statute and granted a sinecure of
coerced membership are fundamentally undemocractic. Whereas Lavigne did
not compromise the democratic principle, Quebec’s legislation required adherence to a “scheme advocating state-imposed compulsory membership”.51 Justice Bastarache went on to state that “[i]deological constraint exists in particular
where membership numbers are used to promote ideological agendas”, and
added that “this is so even where there is no evidence that the union is coercing
its members to believe in what it promotes”; in such circumstances, adherence
is “itself a form of ideological coercion”.52 Describing the regime as a “system
of forced association and state control over work opportunity”, he concluded
that “the democratic rights of workers” had been taken away.53 Emphatically,
he declared that “[b]eing forced to accept and participate in a system that severely limits the democratic principle in the area of labour relations is a form of
coercion that cannot be segregated totally from ideological conformity”.54
The contrast was stark between Bastarache J., who regarded the scheme as a
serious infringement of section 2(d)’s negative and positive entitlements, and

47

Advance Cutting, supra, note 5, at para. 19.
Id., at para. 17.
49
Id.
50
Id., at para. 27.
51
Id., at para. 28 (emphasis added).
52
Id. (emphasis added). At para. 36, he explained that the Rand formula does not negate the
democratic principle because a majority of workers choose accreditation and approve the collective
agreement; that means workers can still choose to work in a non-unionized environment and where
a union is in place, the ultimate forced association is justified by the majority principle.
53
Id., at para. 34.
54
Id.
48
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LeBel J., who regarded it as a limited interference with a negative entitlement
which should be checked by internal limitations. Divergent interpretations of
the right in turn prompted different views of the Charter’s evidentiary requirements. As far as LeBel J. was concerned, the appellants could not establish a
breach without exposing the particulars of ideological conformity. Meanwhile,
after characterizing compulsory unionization as ideological in nature, Bastarache J., quickly dismissed the government’s section 1 argument. 55 That left
Iacobucci J. admitting that he found himself in an “unusual situation”.56 Though
he found, under section 2(d), that the legislation failed to provide “any justification” for compelled union association,57 he concluded that the scheme was
saved under section 1 by its “unique and complex historical context”. 58
In some respects, Advance Cutting signalled the second “trilogy” decision in
Dunmore v. Ontario.59 Though the positive entitlement was not at issue, Advance Cutting hinted that the Court might be prepared to reconsider the assumption that section 2(d) is an individual, rather than a collective,
entitlement.60 It is remarkable, as well, that a majority upheld a regime that
derogated from the Rand formula, which has for years been a mainstay of
Canadian labour law. Not only that, the infringement was much more severe in
Advance Cutting than in Lavigne, because “being forced by the government to
join one of five specified unions differs drastically from being forced to pay
union dues”.61
At the same time, elements of Advance Cutting would prove inconsistent
with the Court’s decision in Dunmore. Just as LeBel J. emphasized the principle of deference in labour relations, Madam Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s concurring opinion repeatedly spoke of the need for judicial restraint, judicial
parsimony, caution and prudence.62 Yet all members of the Court who deferred
to the legislature in Advance Cutting joined Bastarache J.’s opinion in Dunmore, which was anything but deferential.
55
Id., at paras. 43-51 (explaining that even if the statute’s stated objectives were accepted, its
provisions would fail the rational connection and minimal impairment tests).
56
Id., at para. 281.
57
Id., at para. 287.
58
Id., at para. 288.
59
2001 SCC 94.
60
See supra, note 49 (per Bastarache J.). Meantime, while LeBel J. emphasized the individual conception of the right, to show that his opinion was consistent with the jurisprudence, he also
stated that the Court “has never forgotten that the act of association brings together, for some
common purpose, a group of human beings”, and that the case law has emphasized the “fundamental societal value of freedom of association”; id., at para. 170.
61
Id., at para. 32 (per Bastarache J.); see also para. 20 (reminding that LaForest J.’s discussions of constitutional issues in Lavigne had nothing to do with mandatory membership).
62
Supra, notes 16-19, as well as note 35 and accompanying text.
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Finally, there is the question of evidence as a factor in Advance Cutting.
Though LeBel J. maintained that the section 2(d) claim must fail because ideological conformity had not been proved, that standard would shift before long.
In Dunmore, it was difficult to show that the agricultural workers’ inability to
organize was somehow the government’s responsibility. Along with
L’Heureux-Dubé J., the judges who joined LeBel J. in Advance Cutting also
agreed in Dunmore that, despite the presence of systemic, causal factors in the
industry, the government was accountable under the Charter for not intervening
to secure the section 2(d) rights of agricultural workers.
Whether Advance Cutting will undermine the Rand formula in other contexts
remains to be seen. Though LeBel J. stressed that compelled membership is a
limited obligation and therefore not a serious infringement of section 2(d), the
troubled history of Quebec’s construction industry provides a basis for distinction in future cases. Even so, Advance Cutting can only be viewed as a significant victory for labour unions and the primacy of collective interests over
individual freedom. For that reason, it provided the anchor in the Supreme
Court’s “second labour trilogy”.

III. DUNMORE V. ONTARIO (ATTORNEY GENERAL)
Dunmore v. Ontario63 challenged legislation which excluded agricultural
workers from a provincial labour relations scheme. The workers, who had been
excluded from the regime for some 50 years, had never been able to organize.
During one short year, they enjoyed fleeting status under the Agricultural Labour Relations Act (the “ALRA”), which was then repealed following a change
in government.64 The appellants claimed that by reverting to the pre-ALRA
scheme, Ontario had infringed their freedom of association under section 2(d),
and violated section 15(1)’s guarantee of equality.
Prior to Dunmore, the Supreme Court had consistently held that section 2(d)
imposes no obligation on government either to engage in collective bargaining
or to recognize and include particular unions in its management of labour relations.65 More modestly, the guarantee was aimed at statutes which imposed a
direct prohibition on the right to form an association or which otherwise placed
63
Supra, note 59. Justice Bastarache wrote the majority opinion, in which L’Heureux-Dubé
J. separately concurred; Major J. dissented alone.
64
S.O. 1994, c. 6. Section 80 of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, (“LRESLAA”) S.O. 1995,
c. 1, repealed the ALRA in its entirety, thereby subjecting agricultural workers to s. 3(b) of the
Labour Relations Act 1948 (“LRA”), S.O. 1948, c. 51, which excluded them from the LRA’s
labour relation’s regime. Section 80 also terminated any certification rights of trade unions, and any
collective agreements certified, under the ALRA.
65
See, e.g., the Labour Trilogy, Professional Institute, and Delisle, supra, note 9.
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certain restrictions on collective activity.66 Against governing authority, the
appellants argued that, in the absence of status under the LRA, it was impossible for agricultural workers to organize. At trial, Sharpe J., as he then was,
found “nothing in Ontario’s statutory labour law regime that prohibits or even
actively discourages agricultural workers from forming trade unions”. 67 Inasmuch as their efforts to organize might be resisted or undermined by private
employers or the common law, he concluded that their complaint was about
private power, not state action. Effectively, the appellants were attempting to
“impose upon the province a positive duty to enhance the right of freedom of
association” through a legislative scheme “conducive to the enjoyment of” their
rights under section 2(d).68 Justice Sharpe’s conclusion that both claims must
fail was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal, before being reversed by the
Supreme Court of Canada.69
To assume that the outcome in Dunmore was driven by its particular facts
obscures the significance of a decision which shifted section 2(d) in a new
direction and effectively collapsed the distinction between the public and the
private.70 Moreover, the Court could only impose a positive obligation on the
province through an attenuated conception of causation that linked legislative
inaction to the inability of private sector employees to organize. In the end, the
Court held that Ontario was obliged to ensure that its agricultural workers could
exercise their right of associational freedom vis-a-vis private employers in a
meaningful way.
That conclusion was impeded by virtually all the section 2(d) jurisprudence,
including the Court’s immediately preceding decision in Delisle v. Canada.71
There, Bastarache J. held that the Charter did not require the federal government to include RCMP employees in its statutory labour relations regime. As
he explained, “[i]t is because of the very nature of freedom that section 2 generally imposes a negative obligation on the government and not a positive
66

Supra, note 12 (Professional Institute’s four-part test for s. 2(d)).
(1998), 37 O.R. (3d) 287, at 299 (emphasis added).
68
Id., at 300 (emphasis added).
69
Id., at 312 (rejecting the equality claim, because there was no evidence to indicate that agricultural workers as a group can be identified by any combination of the grounds enumerated in s.
15(1), or by any personal characteristic thereto; emphasis in original); see (1999), 182 D.L.R. (4th)
471 (stating, per Krever J.A. that “[w]e agree with the judgment of Sharpe J., both with the result at
which he arrived and his reasons”).
70
At certain junctures the Supreme Court took care to highlight the distinctive history of agricultural labour relations. Dunmore, supra, note 59, at para. 22 (stating that under-inclusive
legislation may, “in unique contexts”, impact the exercise of a constitutional freedom); para. 41
(discussing the distinguishing features of agricultural workers); and para. 47 (explaining why
association is all but impossible in the agricultural sector in Ontario).
71
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 989.
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obligation of protection or assistance”.72 To that he added, “[i]t is accordingly
settled that the exclusion of a group of workers from a specific statutory
scheme” does not preclude the establishment of parallel, independent associations, and that there is no violation of section 2(d) “because one group of workers is included in the regime which another is not”.73 In Delisle Bastarache J.
was firmly of the view that “it must be open to the government to determine
which association or forms of expression are entitled to special support or
protection”.74
On its face Dunmore appeared to raise an indistinguishable issue; but not so,
said the judge who wrote the majority opinion in both cases. To avoid Delisle’s
force as precedent, Bastarache J. identified two key differences between the
RCMP and Ontario’s agricultural workers. First, he pointed out that while the
RCMP’s employer is the government, agricultural workers are part of the private sector. Ordinarily, that difference would give the RCMP a stronger claim,
as government is bound by the Charter and private employers are not. Yet he
turned the tables by claiming that Delisle was limited, as precedent, to the
circumstances of a public employer. It is arguable, he explained, that Delisle
“was not intended to apply where private employers are involved”, because
dictum by L’Heureux-Dubé J. on that point “was not rejected by the Delisle
majority”.75 In other words, the Court was at liberty to grant greater rights to
agricultural workers employed privately than to federal government employees,
because the majority opinion in Delisle had not expressly answered a dictum
which appeared in a sole concurrence. Second, he emphasized that RCMP
employees had been able to form organizations, despite their exclusion from
the scheme, but agricultural workers had not. Though excluding the RCMP had
little or no effect on the exercise of their freedom of association, the same was
not true of Ontario’s agricultural workers.76
Setting the circumstances of these workers aside for a moment, Dunmore is
of transcending importance for its interpretation of section 2(d). In re-casting
the Court’s conception of associational freedom, Bastarache J. denied that the
Supreme Court had endorsed Professional Institute’s framework,77 and dis-
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Id., at 1015 (emphasis added).
Id., at 1017 (emphasis added).
74
Id., at 1018.
75
Dunmore, supra, note 59, at para. 21.
76
Supra, note 71, at 1018; and Dunmore, id., at para. 41. As explained below, however,
Delisle was based on a different and narrower definition of the right than the decision in Dunmore,
which expanded s. 2(d) to include the meaningful exercise of certain collective activities, including
the right to make majority representations to the employer.
77
Id., at para. 15. Specifically, he said that Professional Institute provided “little assistance
to this Court” in CEMA; it is true that CEMA, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157, at 232, cites the four-part test
73

(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The “Second Labour Trilogy”

81

counted it as a test that “sheds light” but does not “capture the full range of
activities protected by section 2(d)”.78 Thus freed from its constraints, he left no
doubt that a collective dimension had been added to the scope of the guarantee.
Invoking Dickson C.J.’s dissent in the Alberta Reference, which he also described as not “explicitly rejected by the majority” on this point, Bastarache J.
declared that the collective is qualitatively different: individuals associate “not
simply because there is strength in numbers, but because communities can
embody objectives that individuals cannot”. 79 Accordingly, to limit section 2(d)
to activities which can be performed by individuals would “render futile these
fundamental initiatives”.80 In doctrinal terms, he reduced the guarantee to a
single inquiry: has the state precluded activity because of its associational
nature, thereby discouraging the collective pursuit of common goals? 81 Without
dismantling it, Bastarache J. displaced Professional Institute’s four-part test by
changing the nature of the inquiry and focusing on whether the legislature
targeted associational conduct because of its concerted or associational nature.82
Albeit reluctant to overrule the Labour Trilogy or the Professional Institute’s
test, Bastarache J. was determined, nonetheless, to shift the Court’s conception
of section 2(d) from its focus on the individual.83 On a close reading of key
paragraphs there is no mistaking his support for an interpretation of associational freedom that extends to collective activities. For all practical purposes,
Dunmore adopted then Dickson C.J.’s Labour Trilogy dissent. Though the
decision left intact the doctrine linking section 2(d) to the rights of individuals,
as noted earlier, the Charter’s guarantee of associational freedom was a dismal
failure under that definition of the entitlement. By proposing a “single inquiry”
to determine whether the state interfered with activity because it is collective in

without explicitly endorsing it. As to Delisle, he stated in Dunmore, id., that “this Court did not
have to rule on the validity of the existing framework”; to be precise, though, Delisle, supra, note
71, at 1007, states that CEMA confirmed the Trilogy and “cited with approval” the Professional
Institute test.
78
Id., at para. 16.
79
Id., at para. 16; see also para. 17 (stating that “the very notion of ‘association’ recognizes
the qualitative differences between individuals and collectivities” because “the community assumes
a life of its own and develops needs and priorities that differ from those of its individual members”).
80
Id.
81
Id. (emphasis in original).
82
Id. (emphasis added).
83
Even so, Bastarache J. was careful to note, id., at para. 17, that “this Court has repeatedly
excluded the right to strike and collectively bargain from the protected ambit of s. 2(d)”. Moreover,
on the question of remedy, he stated, “I neither require nor forbid the inclusion of agricultural
workers in a full collective bargaining regime”; id., at para. 68.
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nature, Dunmore injected vitality into a guarantee that was barely alive in the
first 20 years of Charter interpretation.
Redefining the scope of section 2(d) enabled the Court to find a breach in the
circumstances. As noted above, Sharpe J. rejected the claim because nothing in
the statute prohibited the agricultural workers from establishing, belonging to,
or maintaining a labour union.84 Nor did the statute interfere with associational
activities that were constitutionally protected or were otherwise lawful if performed by an individual. 85 Yet the appellants maintained that it was impossible
for them to organize because of their exclusion from the statutory regime. In
response to the claim, Bastarache J. framed the central question in these terms:
can excluding agricultural workers from a statutory labour relations regime,
without expressly or intentionally prohibiting association, constitute a “substantial interference” with freedom of association? 86 Pursuant to his revitalized
conception of the guarantee, Bastarache J. expanded section 2(d) to include
“certain collective activities”, which, he maintained, must be recognized if the
freedom to form and maintain an association is to have any meaning. 87
The next step in the analysis explained how the province violated the Charter
by not legislating to protect the “meaningful exercise” of section 2(d)’s guarantee.88 Not only did the trial judge attribute the workers’ problems to the private
actions of their employers, there was little authority in the Charter jurisprudence for the imposition of positive obligations on the government. To transform a question of private employment relations into a breach of the Charter,
Bastarache J. transposed section 15’s concept of underinclusion to section 2(d).
The statute’s exclusion of agricultural workers avoided the public/private dichotomy through the following reasoning. If underinclusion can state a claim
under section 15(1), he suggested, it can also ground a breach of section 2 when
the underinclusion results in “the denial of a fundamental freedom”. 89 Put differently, a claim that should be brought under section 15 is viable under section
2 when the legislature’s inaction has adverse consequences for one of its fundamental freedoms.

84

This is point one in the four-point Professional Institute test, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 367, at 402.
Points three and four of the test explain that associational activities are covered by s. 2(d)
if the same activities would be protected if undertaken by individuals: id.
86
Dunmore, 2001 SCC 94, at para. 23 (emphasis added).
87
Id.
88
Id., at para. 20 (asking whether, in order to make the freedom to organize “meaningful”, s.
2(d) imposes a positive obligation on the state to extend protective legislation to unprotected
groups).
89
Id., at para. 28 (adding, as well, that “while it is generally desirable to confine claims of
underinclusion to s. 15(1)”, it is not appropriate to do so at the expense of a fundamental freedom).
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This did not mean that the Charter would oblige the state to act in all cases.
After noting that the Court should guard against reviewing legislative silence,
Bastarache J. indicated that Dunmore’s circumstances were different. Thus he
maintained that it is formalistic to consign the relationship between employer
and employee to the private sphere when the government has regulated the
relationship generally, though in a way that selectively excluded some workers.
Should the Court impose a positive obligation on the state to protect private
workers from their private employers, he stated, “that is only because such
imposition is justified in the circumstances”. 90
That left unanswered the question whether the statutory exclusion had in fact
substantially interfered with the section 2(d) rights of these workers. Even if the
province failed to intervene, it was not self-evident that the government’s inaction was the reason Ontario’s agricultural workers were without a union. Still,
on the strength of their history, Bastarache J. found that there would be “no
possibility for association as such without minimum statutory protection”. 91
Nor did he regard agricultural workers, who are marked by “their political
impotence, their lack of resources to associate without state protection and their
vulnerability to reprisal by their employers”, as comparable to the RCMP in
Delisle.92 In the circumstances, he concluded that the workers’ plight was reinforced by legislation that failed to provide minimum protection and isolated
agricultural workers from the general regime of labour relations.
As a result, Ontario’s revival of the LRA did not “simply allow private circumstances to subsist; it re-inforced those circumstances by excluding agricultural workers from the only available channel for associational activity”.93 By
extending statutory protection to nearly every other class of worker, and selectively excluding these workers, the LRA discredited their efforts and placed a
chilling effect on their non-statutory union activity.94 On the question of breach,
Bastarache J. found that the difficulties inherent in organizing farm workers,
along with threats of economic reprisal from employers, could only partly
explain why association was “all but impossible” in Ontario’s agricultural
sector; equally important were the known and foreseeable effects of the legisla-
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Id., at para. 29.
Id., at paras. 39-42, and especially para. 40 (stating that the repeal of the ALRA was not
the decisive issue; rather, it was the combined effect of the LRESLAA and LRA, which “implicates
the decades-long exclusion of agricultural workers from the labour relations regime”; emphasis
added).
92
Id., at para. 41.
93
Id., at para. 44 (emphasis added).
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Id. See also L’Heureux-Dubé J., at paras. 148-53 (explaining that the chilling effect of the
impugned provisions forced agricultural workers to abandon associational efforts and to restrain
from further associational activities).
91

84

Supreme Court Law Review

(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)

tion which, in excluding agricultural workers, substantially interfered with their
fundamental freedom to organize.95
Having found that the legislation failed under section 1, in large part because
its categorical exclusion of all agricultural workers failed minimal impairment,
Bastarache J. addressed the level of statutory protection section 2(d) would
require.96 Without committing the Court to a specific remedy, he stated that the
principles outlined in the decision “require at a minimum a regime that provides agricultural workers with the protection necessary for them to exercise
their constitutional freedom to form and maintain associations”. 97 In further
explanation, he indicated that section 2(d) also necessitated whatever protections
are
“judged
essential”
to
the
meaningful
exercise of associational freedom, “such as freedom to assemble, to participate
in the lawful activities of the association and to make representations, and the
right to be free from interference, coercion and discrimination in the exercise of
these freedoms”.98
At face value, Dunmore stands for the novel proposition that the government
has a constitutional obligation to protect private employees from private employers. As a matter of Charter interpretation, however, the Court’s reconceptualization of section 2(d), some 15 years after the Labour Trilogy, is nothing less
than a breakthrough. For escaping the constraints of the Labour Trilogy and
Professional Institute, Bastarache J.’s opinion should be applauded.99 Moreover, it is evident that agricultural workers are disadvantaged, and that categorical exclusions, such as the LRA’s, should be difficult to justify. At the
same time, it was next to impossible for the Court to find a breach of section
95

Id., at para. 48. On the evidence, Sharpe J., at trial, and Major J., at the Supreme Court of
Canada, are surely correct that factors other than the statutory exclusion explain the inability of
these workers to organize. Thus Major J. concluded that the appellants failed to establish that the
state is causally responsible for the inability of agricultural workers to exercise a fundamental
freedom, and that s. 2(d) does not impose a positive obligation of protection or inclusion on the
state in this case: id., at paras. 212-14.
96
Id., at paras. 57-59 (discussing the margin of deference owed the legislature and concluding that the categorical exclusion of agricultural workers could not be justified).
97
Id., at para. 67. The remedial dilemma was that striking down the LRESLAA would reenact the repealed statute, the ALRA, and the Court rightly concluded that it should not “constitutionalize” the ALRA. At the same time, striking the LRA’s exclusion clause would have the effect
of extending collective bargaining rights to these workers, and that could not be done without
overruling the prior s. 2(d) jurisprudence. To avoid both prospects, Bastarache J. struck the exclusion clause but suspended the order for 18 months to give the province time to decide on an appropriate response.
98
Id.
99
See J. Cameron, “Back to Fundamentals: Multidisciplinary Partnerships and Freedom of
Association Under s. 2(b) of the Charter” (2000), 50 U.T.L.J. 161, at 269-78 (urging the Court to
reconsider the purposes of s. 2(d)).

(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The “Second Labour Trilogy”

85

2(d) under existing authority: the jurisprudence and Delisle v. Canada, in particular, did not easily permit it, and nor did prevailing assumptions about the
public/private distinction. And never before had the Court shown such eagerness to impose a positive obligation on government, especially in the field of
labour relations. In fact, as Advance Cutting confirmed, less than two months
earlier, deference was tantamount to an absolute rule in labour cases. 100
If the outcome in Dunmore appears driven by politics rather than principle, it
also reveals how impoverished the Charter doctrine is, under section 15 as well
as under section 2(d).101 A conventional analysis would have analyzed the
statute’s exclusion of agricultural workers as a violation of equality. By being
selectively excluded from the statutory scheme, these workers were not treated
the same way and were unequal, relative to other workers. Unfortunately, the
Court’s definition of equality is so encumbered by criteria and assumptions
about human dignity it could not accommodate a claim that was a better fit
under section 15 than under section 2(d). To avoid a result it considered unacceptable, the Court had to alter the scope of associational freedom, deconstruct
the public/private distinction, and support a conclusion that the statute, not the
nature of the industry, was the cause of the workers’ inability to organize.
Under a more constructive definition of equality, these distortions would have
been unnecessary.
It is too early to predict Dunmore’s impact. Attempts to apply its principle of
collective endeavour to other contexts could be met with the answer that Dunmore was a labour relations case or, more precisely, a labour relations case
particular to the circumstances of agricultural workers. At the same time, there
is little in Bastarache J.’s discussion of section 2(d) to suggest that his conception of collective activity was specific to the circumstances of the case. Likewise, he was also able to dismiss concerns about the public/private distinction
and the authority of Dolphin Delivery by declaring that the Court’s understanding of state action had “matured” since that decision, and might mature “further
in light of evolving Charter values”.102 If Advance Cutting presaged Dunmore
in a certain way, these comments about Dolphin Delivery’s declining stature
could hardly have provided a more explicit cue to the third decision in the
trilogy.

100

Supra, notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
Though Bastarache J. did not address the s. 15 claim, L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s concurring
reasons concluded that the occupational status of agricultural workers constituted an analogous
ground under s. 15(1); Advance Cutting, 2001 SCC 70, at paras. 165-70.
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IV. R.W.D.S.U. V. PEPSI–COLA CANADA BEVERAGES (WEST)103
As noted, Dunmore held that the relationship between farmers and their employees was not private. In a decision that directly implicated Dolphin Delivery,
Pepsi-Cola extended the constitutionalization of private relations in a common
law context. One of the Supreme Court’s early landmarks, Dolphin Delivery
held that the Charter does not apply to common law actions between private
parties, and that section 2(b) would not protect labour unions in proceedings
brought to enjoin secondary picketing.104 There, McIntyre J.’s dicta was clear
that picketing, which is included in section 2(b)’s guarantee of expressive
freedom, could justifiably be limited under section 1. Undeterred by precedent,
Pepsi-Cola held, to the contrary, that the common law must be modified to
accommodate the Charter’s protection of picketing, whether primary or secondary.
In the first 20 years, it was difficult to predict whether and when the Court
would defer to the legislature or enforce the Charter; whether and when the
common law would be modified to reflect Charter values was little different.
On that question, the Court has both declined the opportunity, claiming that it is
the legislature’s prerogative to change the law, and taken the initiative, on
grounds that the common law is judge-made and that it is the court’s responsibility to ensure that its evolution is compatible with the Charter. R. v. Salituro
spoke to the ambivalence of this dynamic in stating that “[j]udges can and
should adapt the common law to reflect the changing social, moral and economic fabric of the country”, and adding the qualification that there are “significant constraints on the power of the judiciary to change the law”. 105
In Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, for example, the Court refused
to modify the law of defamation to accommodate the constitutional status of
expressive freedom.106 As Cory J. explained, the judiciary has “traditionally
been cautious regarding the extent to which they will amend the common law”,
and that “[f]ar-reaching changes to the common law must be left to the legislature”.107 In Pepsi-Cola, however, the joint opinion of McLachlin C.J. and LeBel
J. declared that statutory silence should not be interpreted as a legislative intent
to crystallize the common law. In their view, when the legislature chose not to
address or alter the common law of secondary picketing, the lawmakers “must
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[1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, at 670.
106
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130.
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be taken” to have understood that the common law is subject to change at the
hands of the judiciary.108
Prior to Pepsi-Cola, Charter values had not been applied in litigation between purely private parties.109 The two precedents closest on point were Dolphin Delivery and Hill v. Church of Scientology, and though the Charter claim
failed each time, Pepsi-Cola relied on both. First the joint opinion invoked
Dolphin Delivery and McIntyre J.’s much-studied remark that, even when it
does not apply, the Charter is “far from irrelevant to private litigants whose
disputes fall to be decided at common law”.110 There, in dictum, he suggested
that the judiciary ought to develop and apply the principles of the common law
in a manner consistent with the fundamental values of the Constitution.111
Without repeating Dunmore’s observation that the Court’s understanding of
Dolphin Delivery had matured, the joint opinion in Pepsi-Cola added that the
common law “does not grow in isolation from the Charter, but rather with it”. 112
Accordingly, the judges found that the common law reflects Charter values,
that freedom of expression is one such value, and that the common law must be
modified to accommodate section 2(b)’s interest in protecting secondary labour
picketing.
Second, in explaining its Charter values methodology, the joint opinion in
Pepsi-Cola referred to Scientology, which balanced expressive freedom against
reputation, and found that the Charter value at stake was not strong enough to
demand modifications to the law of defamation. Though Pepsi-Cola described
Scientology’s as a “flexible balancing” approach, the purpose of flexibility in
that case was to make it difficult for one private party to invoke the Charter in a
contest against another private party. 113 In fact, the decision expressly cautioned
against importing into private litigation the analysis which applies in cases
involving government action. 114 Accordingly, Cory J. declared that a section 1
analysis was unnecessary in settings which posed a conflict between principles;
in such circumstances, it was sufficient for the Court to weigh Charter values,
framed in general terms, against the underlying principles of the common
law.115
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On the merits Cory J. attributed significant value to the protection of reputation and then found, in comparison, that defamatory statements are “very tenuously connected to the core values which underlie section 2(b)”.116 In the
circumstances, expressive freedom did not stand a chance in the balancing of
values, and though Scientology and Pepsi-Cola both concerned private relations, the Charter modified the common law in one but not the other. The difference between the two was that secondary labour picketing is high value
expression and defamatory statements are not.
Though it worked in favour of expressive freedom, Pepsi-Cola reverted to a
methodology that rests on a subjective assessment of the value of expression.
Pursuant to that approach, the joint opinion declared that picketing, and especially labour picketing, engages the “highest constitutional values”.117 In the
view of the judges, expression on working conditions “contributes to selfunderstanding as well as to the ability to influence one’s working and nonworking life”.118 Moreover, as the presumptive imbalance between the employer’s power and the worker’s vulnerability informs “virtually all aspects of
the employment relationship”, free expression plays a “significant role in redressing or alleviating this imbalance”.119 Last but not least, by bringing debate
on labour conditions into the public realm, this expressive activity benefits
society as a whole.120
The specific issue at stake in Pepsi-Cola was whether secondary picketing is
illegal per se at common law. Any such principle would be difficult to sustain
under a conventional section 1 analysis, as the minimal impairment element of
proportionality looks askance at blanket prohibitions and categorical rules.
According to Scientology, though, common law rules do not have to be justified
under section 1. Though it claimed to follow that approach, the joint opinion
blurred two Charter methodologies that Scientology indicated should be kept
separate.121
A further complication was KMart which, only a few year earlier, had extended constitutional status to secondary labour leafleting, by arguing that
appeals to persuasion and should not be equated with picketing, which is coer-
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cive and can therefore be regulated.122 Though KMart did not purport to address
the status of secondary picketing at common law, the Court was explicit in that
case that picketing and leafleting have “fundamentally different effects”. More
specifically, Cory J. declared that “[w]hile the former uses coercion and obedience to a picket line to impede public access to an enterprise”, the latter “attempts to rationally persuade consumers to take their business elsewhere”. 123
Though the viability of that distinction is questionable, it was adopted by all
members of the panel in KMart and therefore invited a response in Pepsi-Cola.
KMart emphasized the “signalling effect” of a picket line, which acts as a
barrier and coerces individuals not to cross. Without overruling KMart’s analysis, the joint opinion indicated that the signalling effect should be “carefully
assessed”.124 The Chief Justice and LeBel J. pointed out that picketing may
have a coercive signal effect, but that does not mean the activity is not expression and worthy of protection.125 Rather than state a special rule for picketing,
the courts should acknowledge its status as expression and determine the permissibility of limits on a case-to-case basis. In reply to Cory J.’s KMart distinction between coercion and an appeal to persuasion, the judges added that
section 2(b)’s protection is not contingent on rationality, either on the part of
the speaker or the listener.126 The judges thought that to proceed otherwise
would suggest that labour expression is “fundamentally less important” than
expression in other contexts. 127 In any case, they noted, it is a mistake to conclude that picketing’s coercive effect is effective, or that picketing is coercive
rather than persuasive in all cases.128
The joint opinion expressed the concern that a common law rule designating
secondary picketing as illegal would constitute a “special rule for unions”. 129
By way of rectification, Pepsi-Cola declared that all picketing is allowed,
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[1999] 2 S.C.R. 1083.
Id., at 1116.
124
Pepsi-Cola, 2002 SCC 8, at para. 95.
125
Id., at para. 96 (stating that it is difficult to see “how a signal can be other than expressive”, and that the underlying concern of KMart is that “the signal will express too much, that it
will be too effective”).
126
Id., at para. 97 (stating that irrationality may result in particular kinds of speech being accorded less protection, without justifying the denial of all protection).
127
Id., at paras. 96 and 97; see also para. 80 (indicating concern that an independent tort of
secondary picketing applies only in a labour context and creates a distinction between labour and
other picketing that is difficult to justify).
128
Id., at paras. 95 and 98.
129
Id., at para. 97.
123
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whether primary or secondary, unless it involves tortious or criminal conduct. 130
Though there might be anomalies, the joint opinion stated that “it is safe to
assert that a wrongful action-based approach will catch most problematic picketing” and that the law of tort can be expected “to develop in accordance with
Charter values”.131 For all intents and purposes, Pepsi-Cola constitutionalized
the common law pertaining to labour disputes, and effectively overruled Dolphin Delivery. Though the Court argued that Dolphin Delivery left the issue of
secondary picketing open, McIntyre J. was clear that private relations are not
subject to the Charter.132 Through Pepsi-Cola’s application of a values analysis,
the Charter became as binding on private parties as it would have been on
legislation enacted by the government.
As the crucial aspect of the decision, Pepsi-Cola’s constitutionalization of
the common law between private litigants will attract comment and encourage
new claims. Rather than engage that issue, this paper draws attention to related
anomalies which are created by the Court’s decision to constitutionalize relations between a union and a third party stranger to a labour dispute. From a
methodological perspective, the difference between the Court’s Charter values
analysis in Church of Scientology and in Pepsi-Cola is significant. In Scientology, Cory J. declared that changes to the common law should be made by the
legislature, that the rules that apply in cases involving government should not
be imported into private litigation, that dual burdens should be imposed on
those invoking the Charter against other private parties, and that common law
limits on Charter values do not require formal justification.
By contrast, Pepsi-Cola began from a different set of assumptions. The joint
opinion emphasized that “free speech is near the top of the values that Canadians hold dear”, and indicated more than once that expressive activity is particularly valuable in the area of labour relations.133 Not only was labour expression
valuable to its speakers, in stirring public debate the Court found that it had
wider value. To back-track yet again, the litigation in Scientology arose after
the Church decided to publicize its concerns about a Crown attorney who exercised significant powers in relation to the criminal process. Given the plaintiff’s
position as an officer of the Crown and the courts, it is arguable that the private
litigation there had a more compelling public dimension than Pepsi-Cola’s
130
See, e.g., id., at para. 78 (stating, as well, that picketing which breaches the criminal law
or the specific torts like trespass, nuisance, intimidation, defamation or misrepresentation will be
impermissible).
131
Id., at para. 106.
132
Id., at para. 43 (claiming that because Dolphin Delivery assumed that the proposed picketing would be tortious, the Court never addressed the question whether secondary picketing is illegal
per se).
133
Id., at para. 91.
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strike between a private employer and its employees. 134 The statements by the
Church were malicious and the plaintiff would have succeeded under almost
any standard that modified the balance between reputation and expressive
freedom. Yet the Court failed to grasp that, defamatory though they were, the
Church’s statements spoke to the accountability of public servants.
Because the content of secondary picketing was deemed important, the Court
found that the “starting point” must be freedom of expression, and that limitations are permitted but “only to the extent” that is justified under section 1.135 In
this there is little resemblance between the approach followed in Scientology.
As Pepsi-Cola indicated, “[t]he preferred methodology is to begin with the
proposition that secondary picketing is prima facie legal, and then impose such
limitations as may be justified in the interests of protecting third parties”. 136
On the question of limits and the harm secondary picketing would inflict on
neutral third parties, it is instructive to compare the Court’s approach to harm in
other contexts. As R. v. Keegstra, R. v. Butler and other decisions confirm,
section 1 does not require proof of concrete or particular harm.137 It was sufficient, in the past, that the expressive activity offended subjective perceptions or
principles of equality. Moreover, Scientology upheld an unprecedented award
of damages for harm to reputation, in circumstances where the evidence of any
impact on the individual’s standing in the community was weak, if not nonexistent. By assuming that valueless expression must also be harmful, the Court
equated value and harm in these cases.
Most recently, Pepsi-Cola’s joint opinion reasoned that if primary picketing
can permissibly have a harmful impact on third parties and the public, there is
little reason to treat secondary picketing differently. 138 In this, the joint opinion
glossed the distinction between the harm neutrals might indirectly suffer as the
result of successful primary picketing, and secondary picketing’s direct infliction of harm on parties who, as strangers to the dispute, have little power or
influence to affect its resolution.139 In Dolphin Delivery, for example, McIntyre

134
The lawsuit in Scientology was linked to government action because the plaintiff was a
public servant defending himself from criticism of his actions as a Crown attorney, and was funded
in the litigation by his employer, the Attorney General; Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at 116163.
135
Pepsi-Cola, supra, note 124, at para. 37.
136
Id., at para. 67.
137
[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; and R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452; see also Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825.
138
Pepsi-Cola, supra, note 124, at para. 90 (stating that the rationale for restricting secondary
picketing also applies to primary picketing).
139
According to the Court’s account of the facts, the secondary activities in this bitter strike
included the picketing of certain retail outlets, which prevented deliveries and dissuaded store staff
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J. stated that secondary picketing differs “because the third party is not concerned in the dispute” and “the basis of our system of collective bargaining is
that the parties themselves should, whenever possible, work out their own
agreement.140 To that he added “[i]t is reasonable to restrain picketing so that
the conflict will not escalate beyond the actual parties”. 141 Moreover, in contrast
to the cases above, which imposed limits on expressive activity linked to nonparticularized psychological and perceptive harm, Pepsi-Cola accepted that
economic harm can be directly inflicted on third parties. 142 Though the Court
acknowledged the permissibility of limits by its “wrongful action” exception to
picketing, the point is that its perception of harm varies from case to case,
depending on its approval or disapproval of the expressive activity in question.
In its section 2(b) jurisprudence last year, there were indications that a majority of the Court might be prepared to step away from a “values methodology”.143 Insofar as a “values analysis” is undertaken, in circumstances when the
Charter does not formally apply, Pepsi-Cola demonstrates that the Court remains willing to base the level of constitutional protection it assigns an activity
on its value as expression. The question Pepsi-Cola raises is whether the common law in other litigation between private parties will also be constitutionalized, and whether the infliction of harm will be considered valuable in other
contexts, as it was here. If the answers to those questions are no, then PepsiCola will have exchanged the common law’s special rule for another special
rule for unions under the Charter.

V. A FINAL RECKONING
It cannot be a coincidence, especially given labour’s bleak prospects in the
first 20 years of Charter interpretation, that unions emerged as winners in the
“second labour trilogy”. Yet as suggested above, the result could easily have
gone the other way in any or all of these cases. Though the close vote in Advance Cutting speaks for itself, siding with the workers in Dunmore required
the Court to reverse the lower court decisions and revisit the facts as well as the
law. As for the third decision, though a per se rule about secondary labour
picketing would ordinarily be vulnerable under the Charter if contained in
from accepting deliveries, as well as placard carrying outside the hotel where some of the substitute
work force was staying; id., at para. 4.
140
Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 590.
141
Id., at 591.
142
Pepsi-Cola, supra, note 124, at para. 25.
143
Neither Little Sisters, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 nor Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, relied on a
“values methodology” or contextual approach under s. 1, though the dissenting opinion in Sharpe
did.

(2002), 16 S.C.L.R. (2d)

The “Second Labour Trilogy”

93

legislation, the Court could not modify the common law in Pepsi-Cola without
turning its back on Dolphin Delivery and explaining away KMart’s vital distinction between conventional picketing and leafleting.
At the least then, these decisions suggest the following. Advance Cutting’s
retreat from the Rand formula implies that when a choice must be made between collective and individual interests, the collective can be expected to
prevail. Next under Dunmore, the government can be held responsible for not
guaranteeing the meaningful exercise of associational freedom by private sector
employees. Finally, in the wake of Dunmore’s conclusion that the government
has a duty to intervene in private relations, Pepsi-Cola undermined Dolphin
Delivery’s assumption that the public and private must remain separate, lest the
Charter smother the common law. Once having discounted that concern
through a values analysis, Pepsi-Cola dismissed Dolphin Delivery’s dictum that
the common law principles which limit secondary labour picketing are justified.
By reaching in every way the second trilogy shows how far the Court was
prepared to go in securing the rights of workers.
Though the trilogy’s consequences for labour relations and the Charter remain unknown at present, a further question is whether its principles will translate to other issues. If the private became public in Dunmore, and the Charter
modified the common law in Pepsi-Cola, it is dubious that other private relations or fixtures of the common law will now be subject to review as a matter
of reflex. In this, it should be noted that Dunmore is replete with qualifications:
underinclusion should be addressed under section 15; the Court should guard
against reviewing legislative silence; other decisions which refused to impose a
positive obligation were different; and the plight of Dunmore’s workers was
explained by their particular history. The Court can also minimize Pepsi-Cola’s
impact on the common law in private litigation by reviving the principle from
Scientology, that the initiative for change belongs to the legislature, or invoking
Scientology’s other rationale, that the activity in issue is not valuable enough to
displace common law principle. The Court’s eagerness to distinguish the trilogy
decisions in future cases will either confirm or undercut the impression that the
trilogy established special rules for unions.
Another indication that the trilogy’s principles might not translate to other
contexts can be found in Suresh v. Canada.144 There, a Convention refugee
faced refoulment to his mother country, in circumstances which placed him at
risk of being tortured upon his return. He challenged the constitutionality of the
grounds for deportation, as well as the deportation order itself. Essentially,
144

2002 SCC 1. It is appropriate to disclose that I acted as counsel for FACT (Federation of
Associations of Canadian Tamils), which was granted intervenor status in the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
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section 19 of the Immigration Act provides that a refugee can be deported when
there are reasonable grounds to believe that person is a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe has engaged in terrorism,
either in the past or at present.145 While the Court found that a deportee could
not generally be deported to face a substantial risk of torture, and specified the
procedures that are required by section 7 before an order can be made, it neglected to address the constitutionality of section 19.
Once the Court concluded that the deportation order could not stand, it became unnecessary to deal with section 19. Still, its willingness to overlook
provisions which, on the face of it, represent a serious interference with expressive and associational freedom, is disturbing. This is especially troubling because the activity which prompted the deportation order was fund-raising,
which is not only constitutionally protected but also, in appellant’s case, was
remote in time and place from the commission of any terrorist acts.146 Yet the
Court showed no interest in the legislation’s implications for section 2(b) and
(d), including its unavoidable chilling effects on refugee and immigrant populations.147 Whereas the deportation order was specific to Suresh, section 19,
which might inhibit any number of individuals from exercising their constitutional rights, stayed in place.
As noted above, the majority and concurring opinions in Dunmore found that
legislative inaction placed an impermissible chill on the organizational activities of Ontario’s agricultural workers. This is an unusual interpretation of a
doctrine whose underlying principle is that over-reaching by the legislature
might catch constitutionally protected activity as well as activity that can justifiably be limited. The essence of the doctrine is the inhibiting and selfcensoring impact of government regulation that sweeps too broadly and thereby
“chills” legitimate activity.148 In Dunmore, neither Bastarache J. nor
L’Heureux-Dubé J. cited authority for the proposition that the state can chill the
exercise of constitutional rights by doing nothing at all; in fact, L’Heureux145

See s. 19(1)(f)(iii)(B) (the membership provisions), and s. 19(1)(f)(ii) (the terrorism provision) of the Immigration Act, 1985, R.S.C., C-I-2.
146
Suresh’s link to terrorism was that he engaged in fund-raising for Tamil organizations in
Canada. Though the activity in question was legal and Suresh had committed no crime, his deportation was based on the opinion of security authorities that he was linked to the LTTE (Tamil Tigers),
the rebel party in Sri Lanka’s civil war, through organizations in Canada. Id., at 10.
147
The Court did not so much as mention the legislation’s implications for freedom of association; even as to freedom of expression, it went no farther than to make equivocal remarks about
the constitutionality of s. 19, as incorporated into s. 53, the deportation provision; id., at paras. 1038.
148
See, e.g., Keegstra, supra, note 137, at 850 (per McLachlin J., dissenting, and explaining
that the intrusiveness of a limitation on expressive freedom must extend to those who may be
deterred from legitimate activity by uncertainty as to whether they might be convicted).
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Dubé J. stated that the concept is premised on the idea that individuals anticipating penalties might hesitate before exercising their rights.149 Assuming that
chilling effects can be sustained through government action or inaction, the
quirky use of the concept in Dunmore, when set against Suresh, which presented a classic example, reinforces the impression that the Court established
special rules for unions in these cases.
The decision whether to enforce a guarantee or acquiesce in the status quo,
whether under statute or common law, will depend on the Court’s perception of
what justice requires in the circumstances. Disagreement as to the meaning and
demands of justice is inevitable, as is the tension between a result-oriented
jurisprudence and one that values principle. If the justness of principle can
provoke almost as much disagreement as debate about a just or unjust result, at
the least, principle provides a standard by which results can be compared from
case to case. How successfully the Court demonstrates its commitment to principle should be the true test of its jurisprudence.
Looking at the second trilogy from that perspective, it is difficult to conclude
that principle was consistently applied in these cases. For instance, Advance
Cutting and Dunmore cannot be easily reconciled, for those who comprised the
majority in Advance Cutting abandoned their fealty to deference in labour
relations and accepted a lenient standard of proof on the question of breach in
Dunmore. The appellants’ claim was against the weight of authority, and there
was no other way for the workers to win in that case.
The extension of the Charter to private relations is another key feature of
these decisions. Once under a statutory regime, in Dunmore, and then again,
under the common law in Pepsi-Cola, the Court discounted two wellestablished assumptions of Charter interpretation. First, in imposing a positive
constitutional obligation on the government to protect one party from another in
private relations, Dunmore ventured some distance from the boundaries marked
by the Court’s previous Charter jurisprudence. Then the principle that the Charter does not apply to common law litigation between private parties vanished in
Pepsi-Cola. The Court achieved this feat through a values analysis, which plays
a role when the Charter does not apply. The artifice was pressed into service to
avoid open contradiction between Pepsi-Cola and Dolphin Delivery, which was
directly on point. Still, the result was the same, in substantive terms, as it would
have been had the Court overruled Dolphin Delivery and formally applied the

149
Dunmore, 2002 SCC 8, at para. 148 (emphasis added). Though she cited Big M, [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295, there the exercise of religious freedom was coerced or inhibited by the government’s
mandatory Sunday closing law; in other words, the adverse consequences for s. 2(a) arose from
statutory action, not inaction.
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Charter. Once again, workers would not have won in Dunmore or Pepsi-Cola
under the existing jurisprudence.
Time will tell whether the second trilogy should be understood as a series of
decisions favourable to workers, or otherwise result in applications to other
Charter claims.
A final point arises from Dunmore and its brief consideration of the choice
between sections 2(d) and 15. As noted earlier, it would have made better
analytical sense to place the statute’s defect of underinclusion under section
15’s jurisdiction. In light of doctrine, the claim could not easily succeed under
either guarantee, and so the Court chose to alter its definition of associational
freedom. How that might affect the relationship between sections 2(d) and 1 did
not enter the discussion, for the likely reason that it was not considered relevant.
Lavoie v. Canada (Public Service Commission), the most recent equality decision, is mentioned here because it shows, after many years and the arrival of
the Law test, that the Court remains as transfixed as ever by the relationship
between section 15 and section 1.150 The question for answer in Lavoie was
whether a citizen’s preference in access to federal public service employment
violated the equality rights of non-citizens and, if so, whether the limit was
justifiable under section 1. Though the Court upheld the preference by a vote of
6 to 3, Arbour J. challenged Bastarache J.’s section 15 analysis.151 At this stage
of an article on the rights of workers, there is not time or space to launch an
analysis of their disagreement, and little percentage taking sides between the
two. Rather, the idea is to offer a few modest observations.
The starting point is that, in truth, section 15 has largely been an exercise in
frustration. Albeit with exceptions, disagreement among members of the Court
may be the defining characteristic of the equality jurisprudence. The Supreme
Court of Canada’s indecision as to the scope of the guarantee was, for years
following its initial interpretation in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, a source of uncertainty and irritation.152 Then it seemed possible to imagine
a new era when all members of the Court endorsed Iacobucci J.’s framework
for section 15 analysis in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration).153 If agreement on a standard marked a step forward, unfortunately it
came in the form of a methodology that is abstract and unwieldy.
150
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Without recounting the details, the disagreement between Bastarache J. and
Arbour J. in Lavoie centred on the “human dignity” test and, in particular, the
relative importance of subjective and objective perceptions of what offends an
individual’s dignity under section 15.154 As the exchange between the judges
demonstrates, Law can support a generous interpretation of the guarantee and
just as easily lead to internal limits on the right. As a result, both could claim
that their analysis in Lavoie was faithful to the Law methodology.155 The difference between the two approaches is that a more generous interpretation conceptualizes the relationship between the right and its limits under section 1 a
different way than its alternative, which would restrict the scope of the guarantee.
For that reason, the debate on this point between Bastarache J. and Arbour J.
should be understood as an important one. Far from providing a reliable structure for section 15 analysis, the human dignity branch of the Law test has further obfuscated the meaning of equality under the Charter. And, as Arbour J.’s
reasons in Lavoie demonstrate, the third inquiry can easily become the off-site
location of a section 1 analysis. 156 In the absence of content, it provides a
mechanism for the Court to expand or contract section 15 at will, on a case to
case basis.
The main point here is that Law failed to resolve the Court’s fundamental
ambivalence toward section 15. As a result, the real question whether the
analysis should be concentrated on section 15 or more readily shunted to sec154

The third part of the Law test requires the Court to determine whether the differential
treatment offends human dignity, according to a battery of criteria which includes the way it is
subjectively and objectively perceived; Lavoie, supra, note 150, at para. 38 (setting out the Law
test).
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For instance, Bastarache J. defended his conclusion that s. 15 had been breached, stating
“[i]t is the very structure of the Charter that mandates [a distinction between the right and its
limits], as well as the methodology adopted by the Court since Andrews”; Lavoie, supra, note 150,
at para. 49. Meantime, in holding that s. 15 was not infringed, Arbour J. claimed that “the broader
reach given to s. 15 the more likely it is that it will be deprived of any real content”, id. at para. 84;
that the third branch of the Law test should be allowed “to do the kind of sorting it was intended to
do”, id., at para. 87, and that a lack of rigour in application would result in “irrevocable damage to
the Law methodology”, id., at para. 81.
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Arbour J. argued that Bastarache J. had so privileged the subjective element of the test as
to strip equality rights of any meaningful content. In her view, this approach compromised the Law
test and undercut the function of s. 1. She supported an objective test that would respect the need
for internal limits. Looking at Law’s objective criterion, the problem is that asking whether a
reasonable person, similarly situated, would understand the distinction as an affront to human
dignity is shorthand for the question whether the inequality is justifiable. In this, Arbour J.’s
analysis shows the degree to which her approach would conduct a s. 1 analysis in s. 15. If a reasonable person would not be affronted by the consequences for her human dignity then s. 15 is not
breached, but what is reasonable is also inherently justifiable.
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tion 1 will be diverted, and in its place there will be more of the skirmishes over
subjective and objective perceptions of dignity that erupted in Lavoie. Yet the
answer to this quandary will not be found in any fresh insights into the condition of human dignity; instead, it is contingent on the Court’s intellectual and
institutional determination to settle the relationship between sections 15 and 1.
This question has nagged the Court from the outset, and it continues to trouble the Court today. In that regard, it is worth remembering that section 15 will
not celebrate its 20th anniversary until 2005. This year’s second labour trilogy
proves that the Court is capable of shifting directions and rethinking the assumptions of the early jurisprudence. If the McLachlin Court can revisit the
Labour Trilogy’s definition of associational freedom, there is no reason it cannot also reconsider its approach to section 15.
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